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On the Variable Perception of Time in Proclus and Aristotle

Nowhere are the different approaches of Plato and Aristotle more manifest than in their respective accounts of time. Where Plato provides a "top-down" account of time as the moving image of eternity, Aristotle works from the "ground-up", identifying time as motion in its sequential aspect. This difference presents a challenge for an ensuing tradition that would think the two philosophers together. The problem is faced head-on by Proclus, who reads the *Timaeus* as a *physiologos* of the highest order, and so existing in ostensible conflict with the *Physics*.[1] Proclus achieves reconciliation by way of cutting Aristotle's view down to size: it derives from a myopic focus on the realm of nature taken in isolation, with the various higher powers toward which nature is oriented – while not totally divorced – collapsed and rendered abstract.[2] In Proclus' elaboration of the proper – i.e., the Platonic – philosophy of nature he provides not only an account of Time in its full ontological dimensions, but also a description of man's perceptual apparatus, by which he perceives Time. It is by this latter discussion that Proclus' updated Platonic account and the original phenomenally-grounded Aristotelian account can be brought into close alignment for comparison. A distinctive feature of Proclus' account is man's capacity to cognitively ascend into union with the intellectual realm, an ascent that corresponds to a rarefied perception of time. The suggestion of this essay is that such variability can also be located within the Aristotelian system, namely in the perception of pleasure, in the perception of one's being-at-work (*energeia*), and in the perception, or rather perceptual correspondence to, one's contemplating eternal things, each offering in turn an increasingly "pure" repose in the perceptual present. This suggestion is not to defend Aristotle from Proclus' critique – Aristotle is indeed obscure on the relation

1 *In Tim.* I, 1.1-23; cf. Steel, 'Why Should We Prefer Plato's *Timaeus* to Aristotle's *Physics*? Proclus' Critique of Aristotle's Causal Explanation of the Physical World', 175-187.

2 Proclus criticizes Aristotle on the basis of dwelling on physical explanations, absent theological mooring, beyond what is called for – a preoccupation Proclus finds to be endemic to Aristotle's work (*In Tim.* I, 294.28-296.12). Aristotle's account of time, then, turns out only to be unfolding an *image* of the "image of eternity" (*In Tim.* IV, 10.4-6). The argumentative manifestation of Aristotle's mistake seems to be his failure to acknowledge that time is not merely dependent on particular souls counting, but on the potential of Soul as such for counting, or employing the unit, which would point the way to Time's proper root in the Intellect (*In Tim.* IV. 9.25-31; 26.17-23; 32.22-28). Proclus transposes Aristotle's definition of time as follows: "a measure of motions... in the sense of that which is such as to produce and to delimit the lifespan and all other changes among the things that are located in time or as that which measures these temporal beings in relation to their paradigms and assimilates them to the latter" (*In Tim.* IV, 20.1-15).

of time to eternity – but to attempt to develop the understanding of the Aristotelian system in light of Neoplatonic distinctions.

1. Proclus on the Perception of Time

In this section, I would like to sketch the basis for the "vertical" axis of time variability (from ordinary to divine), the absence of which from Aristotle would be one symptom of his overemphasis on the *physical* aspect of time. Proclus inherits the idea that the perception of time is variable from Plotinus. For Plotinus, every human-being remains simultaneously a member of the intelligible order, and this order can be returned to in this life by way of a meditative process that – rather literally it seems – reunites the embodied human soul with its origin.[3] As this occurs, time withdraws into its primal unity.[4] Proclus, however, denies that such unification entails ascension from the human rank, occurring instead within the human *psyche*.[5] To see how Proclus' more immanent account of the relation of perception and time functions, we begin by looking at his account of Time.

Time is understood in relation to Eternity. Eternity is a highly universal intelligible essence, acting as the "single comprehension" of the plurality of intelligible essences; it is the medium – something like ice – in which a variety of essences can exist in relation to one another.[6] Time exists in contrast, insofar as things in time are limited not only *formally* but in their essential *activity*. Time resembles Eternity, then, insofar as it itself persists eternally – as a sort of centre encompassing everything that happens in time – but is different in its application of the aspect of procession and motion.[7] Where Eternity is unmoving both in its essence and in its activity, Time is moving, not in its essence, or in its "internal" activity, but in its "external" activity, of which nature is the ultimate representation. Technically speaking, then, Time acts as a middle term allowing *Soul* – the source of motion in nature – to participate in eternity.

Proclus gives us an idea of how nature-bound human-beings make contact with eternal being, within the medium of time, in his explication of the statement at *Timaeus* 28a1 that that which is always Existent and has no Becoming is known by human-beings by way of *noesei meta logou*.[8] In

3 *Enn.* III 4, 3; I. 6, 9; VI. 9, 11.
4 *Enn.* III. 7, 12: "If, then, the Soul withdrew, sinking itself again into its primal unity, Time would disappear: the origin of Time, clearly, is to be traced to the first stir of the Soul's tendency towards the production of the sensible Universe with the consecutive acts ensuing".
5 *In Parm.* 948.12-30, qtd. in Chlup 26-27.
6 *In Tim.* IV, 12.14-22; *ET* 50; cf. *ET* 52.
7 *In Tim.* IV, 26.5-27.33.
8 *In Tim.* I, 243.26-248.6.

short, Proclus forwards a tripartite psychic hierarchy, so that men think by synchronizing their "discursive" intellect – itself combining and dividing retained images (available as the "passive" intellect, corresponding to the imagination) – with a separate "particular" intellect.[9] The takeaway here is that even as man psychically contacts eternal (unchanging, atemporal) things there exists a moving analogue on both the discursive and perceptual levels, since human-beings are unable to utterly transcend beyond their situation in time.

What does this mean for the perception of time? When the human intellect is employed discursively, whether toward encosmic things or extracosmic things, the perception of the immediate surroundings remains present but becomes subsidiary to an envisioning that aggregates retained impressions to new purpose. The retained images utilized by the discursive intellect accord to an internal comprehension not limited by the proximate surroundings. Now, the philosopher, by way of his continued contemplation of eternal things and associated practices, would be an example of a human-being whose imagination is governed so that eternity and divinity reflects upon his perception of the temporal to the maximum degree possible, even over the course of his entire life. The variable perception of time, however, is more easily shown by way of the alternate approach which evokes the divine by working on the imagination directly: namely, the way of inspired poetry, which harnesses the imitative essence of natural things by using them as symbols analogous to higher orders.[10] These analogies can be made suggestive of higher or lower orders: for example, simple depictions might suggest gods where partial depictions suggest daemons, as, depending on the context, the depiction of Apollo might refer to the appropriate henad or to "the being placed in

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9 When discussing the sort of *noesis* that enables human-beings to know eternal things, Proclus dismisses senses of *noesis* exclusive to pure Intellectual beings, and also senses distinctive of enmattered souls; in the latter case, imaginative or passive *noesis* only gives indeterminate impressions, and discursive *noesis* "sees the wholes, but only in parts" and "does not possess the ability to know all at one time and is not coupled with the eternal realm, but proceeds temporally" (*In Tim.* I, 244.29-30; 245.6-8). It can only be that the *noesis* properly capable of knowing eternal being is that of the "particular intellect" – i.e, the instantiation of Intellect as such – and that it is only by man's synergizing his discursive (or *logos*-based) intellect with the particular intellect that he is able to understand eternal being. This intellect "turns its light towards our souls, whenever we turn towards it and we make the *logos* in us completely intellective" (*In Tim.* I, 245.23-26). Whenever, then:

> the *logos* contemplates the intelligible object by circling around it and focusing its activity and movement as it were on a central point. *Noesis* would then know its object non-discursively and indivisibly, whereas the *logos* dances around the essence of the intelligible in a circle and unwinds the substantial unity of all things that it possesses. (*In Tim.* I, 248.1-7; cf. also *In Tim.* I, 246.6-10.)

In other words, then, when man thinks something *as it always is*, this entails his marshaling his temporally-proceeding nature-bound impressions – in the form of his *logos* – into step with the eternal vision of the particular intellect, in a union of discursive and non-discursive *noesis*.

10 *In Remp.* 77.14-25.

the most fragmented level of the Apollonian chain".[11] The human cognition of eternal things, then, always entails an aspect of imaginative correspondence, which corrects for cognition's attachment to the temporal order by adapting retained perceptions more or less in analogy to a higher or lower eternal order.[12] It is in this respect that human-beings can perceive, in life or in poetic experience, at a higher or lower time, so that comprehension occurs not only according to time's external activity, manifesting in the proximate surroundings, but according to time's internal activity, reflecting some aspect of divine order.

2. *Physics* IV.11 and IV.12: Relative Time and Time as Such

We turn now to Aristotle's physical account of time and the relation of the perceiver therein. Following IV.10's survey of *aporia,* the central confusion concerning time would seem to be the adequate distinguishing and reconciliation of the phenomena of "time" (χρόνου) – something like any continuum that individual moments or *nows* can be tracked along, whether marked as past or future – and the "now" (νῦν) – as whatever is presently present, in the full ambivalence thereby suggested. I submit that Aristotle's strategy toward clarification in this case will be to parse the perceptual reception of time in order to distinguish its evident local and global aspects.[13] Time and the *now* bear a certain relativity: the sleeper will connect his last waking *now* to his next waking *now* as if no time has passed, while the man awake during the same period notices time passing.[14] As a rule, then, "when we are unaware of [the *now*'s] being other, there does not seem to be an inbetween time." This occurs whenever "we do not mark off any change but the soul seems to remain in a state that is one and indivisible".

The notion of "indivisibility" *qua* the soul signals a determination elaborated in *De Anima* and related works: perceiving beings reconcile divisible material sense impressions under a comprehending and so, strictly speaking, indivisible rendering – only in this way is the soul able to both compile and

11 *In Remp.* 114.22-27; 147.8-30.

12 cf. *In Tim.* IV, 42.17-31.

13 Animals (including human-beings) are acquainted with time by way of perception (*Mem.* 450a9-13). In this essay I follow in the interpretative strain of those who see Aristotle as maintaining that time is a hylomorphic compound, with motion as its matter and perception as its form; cf. most recently, e.g., Roark, *Aristotle on Time: A Study of the Physics* (2012). The strategy of first abstracting the perceptual influence when considering time would be especially appropriate for the phenomenon given that for Aristotle understanding is achieved precisely when the relevant phenomenon is extrapolated from its temporal manifestation and considered as it (always) is. In order to treat time itself, then, the influence of the temporal mode of apprehension, i.e., perception, in its reception must first be acknowledged, in order to be neutralized and assigned proportion within the full account of the thing itself.

14 *Phys.* 218b20-32.

compare different sensory streams at the same time.[15] This indivisible rendering turns out to be the very form and being-at-work of an animal's appropriately-constituted and divisible material sense organ. As well, however, it serves as the *potency* by which the animal originates movement back through its material basis. Aristotle compares this mechanism to that of a point, which can be taken either as a unit (itself one) or as a divider (drawing attention to two others).[16] In other words, then, perception exists as a singular rendering, but one which, in another sense, takes things within its sphere as individuated and so with distinct potencies to be activated. Applying these distinctions to the formulation given in *Phys.* IV.11, then: change and time only appear insofar as the perceiving soul recognizes difference – or uses the point as a boundary. Otherwise, the soul remains undivided in a persisting *now.*

How is time produced out of the observation of change or motion? Now, motion is distinctive for describing the being-at-work of a *potency* just as such, which therefore never breaks through to independent being in the way that a tree suddenly emerges. The field of motion is then coordinate with the ground in which it takes place, and any motion can be said to correspond to a given amount of magnitude. Both motion and place share, then, the aspect of relative position: the "before and after". Time is just this aspect *qua* motion: motion, insofar as it fits along the before-and-after, and so accords to a linear numberable continuum. It is perceived when we "take cognizance of a before and after in motion", counting moving things just insofar as they follow a sequence.[17]

Now, the *things counted* are perennially different. Time must gain its perceptual uniformity from the indivisible aspect of the soul. Aristotle once again makes the analogy to a point, one that moves and whose relation to its surroundings always changes but which itself remains the same. In the same way that the unified perceptual rendering registers change insofar as the rendering is divided, it registers time insofar as its rendering of the *now* becomes divided.[18] It then uses these *nows* as the units by which to measure the distance – *qua* before and after – from one state of affairs to another.[19]

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15 *DA* 426b15ff.; cf. *MA* 703a1-3. In the simultaneity of the distinguishing of difference, perception is not only "an indivisible act" but occurs in "an indivisible time".

16 "[I]nsofar as it is undivided, the thing that distinguishes is one thing and distinguishes things at one time, but insofar as it has in it to be divided, it uses the same boundary-mark as double at one time. So insofar as it uses a boundary as double, and distinguishes two separate things it acts in a way dividedly, but insofar as it acts by means of one thing, it acts as one and at one time."

17 *Phys.* 219a10-34.

18 "[W]henever we think the extremes differ from the midpoint, and the soul says there are two *nows*, one before and one after, then also we say this to be time."

19 The analogy of the point must be qualified, however – perception could never utterly divest its apprehension of *nows* into atomic moments, otherwise "time would happen to stand still" (*Phys.* 220a9-21). Perceiving beings – perennially moving – when they experience time, experience it not quite as through a divided point, but as through "the extremities of a line", as though by the dilation of their rendering allowing for difference not only to be perceived but to be in a process of continuing flow.

The perception of time involves the numbering of motion in estimation of the number of *nows* it spans, i.e., in the perceptual rendering's self-division taken up *qua* sequence. This kind of time perception is relative and uncertain, in the way that, if one is walking through the forest, he has a sense that the current *now* is distinct from some other one, but is not capable of specifying the precise quantity by which this is so. Since time and motion are commensurate, however, this measurement can be made precise and so universalized. Just as time – the motion counted – is counted according to units of *now*, so also, conversely, can the *nows* be counted according to regular motions, determining the number by the thing numbered, in the way we may delineate any specific thing, such as a horse, in order to count a multitude of them.[20] *Nows* can be referenced, for example, by the cycles of the sun, by the degrees of a sundial, or by the whirring units of a digital clock. In this way, time can be measured to infinitely smaller degrees just as though it were a magnitude, and one's *nows* can be checked against this common standard. Time in this common representation takes on the name of "time" simply.

All motions are subject to this common standard. Perceptually, this results in two separate time senses. The first is the original relative sense, wherein one uses one's own *nows* to measure the motion one observes in terms of "before and after". The second is the derived absolute sense, which works "by determining a motion which will measure the whole motion". Aristotle provides the specific difference as follows: the latter sense permits not only the measuring of motion but also the measuring of "the *being* of the motion".[21] In other words, it is the latter kind of counting, which picks out specific motions to count *by*, that permits motions to be tracked as more than an endless shifting of material – a sheer ocean of flow, as it were – but as being subject to duration according to their respective beings – i.e., as the relatively distinctive co-ordinations of material underlying various independent forms. It is this way of seeing which not only has the observer as a *numberer*, but discloses him as himself *being numbered*, or as subject to finite duration. It is in this recognition that man becomes aware that time is not subject to his *now*, but that his *now* is subject to time – reversing the original perceptual priority. Both kinds of time, then, can be traced to a perceptual origin, and exist as opposites insofar as one remains undivided within its own rendering and the other checks its present rendering against a common standard.

3. The Relation of Time to Pleasure, *Energeia*, and *Theoria*

In dreamless sleep, there is no observation of change whatsoever – the animal's *now* is, as it

20 *Phys.* 220b15-32.
21 *Phys.* 221a2-13.

were, constricted to the point of oblivion, such that the animal is temporarily reduced to vegetative life. It is in waking perception that the animal rendering opens up to, at a minimum, a sense of flow. The observation of motion – and correspondingly distinct *nows* – can occur to a greater or lesser degree: in the middle of a pleasant experience, including the participation in compelling images such as games and dramatic performances, we seem to experience flow in a less disturbed sense than, for example, when we are stuck in the dentist's chair, or committed to a dull obligation.[22] In the latter cases, we find ourselves dividing the *now* more actively, as shown by our frequent attention to the position of the clock. If (i) the measuring of motion against one's own *nows*, and (ii) one's own being measured by time, are opposing perceptual conditions, then what principle accounts for the shifting between them?

One candidate is pleasure: to enjoy an experience is to choose it for its own sake, and in such a condition, one is less motivated to look beyond the current *now* to check where it is fitted within a broader continuum. Now, pleasure for Aristotle is not the perception of the motions accompanying the coming-into-being of some characteristic (*hexis*), but rather a perceptual accompaniment to the being-at-work itself of such a condition.[23] Pleasure, then, is not properly characterized as a motion of process of becoming, but exists as a sort of "bloom", or consequence of some work well-done, infusing the perceptual rendering.[24] Nor, therefore, does it originate in time, but belongs rather to the *now,* being more like a point or unit than a line.[25] Included in pleasure are the aspects of desire and aversion, localized within the rendering, compelling motion towards or away from objects promising the intensification or diminution of the present bloom.[26] We see, then, that to the extent that our *now* becomes divided – breaking a singular flow into a consciousness of other *nows* – we find ourselves unable to fully enjoy the present moment – pursuing whatever desire appeals to us therein – but are compelled to subjugate these present desires to the exigencies of other *nows* beyond the immediate horizon. This is the basis of the plausibility of the suggestion that the *un*divided *now* corresponds to pleasure.

This converse conclusion, however – that the undivided *now* is pleasurable – does not hold. We have hitherto only established that the undivided *now* is *urgent*, if urgency is taken as license to engage

22 Or, to use one of Aristotle's examples, when the actors in a theatrical performance are poor, the spectator turns that much more to his snacks – and, presumably, his watch (*EN* 1175b12-13).

23 *EN* 1173b8-21. Such would only be the case if bodily pleasure was the only kind, but men also enjoy pleasures – such as of mathematics, smells, many things seen and heard, and memories and hopes – without perceptibly painful opposites. Pleasure is not, in other words, a perceptible consequence of material replenishment, but is coeval with perception itself.

24 *EN* 1174b31-34: "But the pleasure brings the activity to completion not as an active condition present with it all along, but as something that comes over it, like the bloom of well-being in people who are at the peak of their powers."

25 *EN* 1174b9-16

26 *DA* 431a10-17.

the matter immediately at hand, rather than conceiving one's situation as only partial, in duty toward some one promised at an another *now*. But pleasure and urgency are not always linked: a terrible crisis in one's life, for example, or – in the case of a dramatic performance – the events visible in the wake of the tragic *anagnorisis*, compel the agent's immediate attention as occurrences of major significance for the rest of his life, but indeed are profoundly painful. Something like *urgency*, then, in contradistinction to pleasure, would distinguish remaining in a relatively undivided *now* from attending to the clock.

What is the urgency to which pleasure is only incidental? Is the the principle, distinguishing the remaining in the relatively undivided *now* from the dividing it up into clock time, the *being-at-work* rather than *being-in-potency* of a *hexis,* to which pleasure (or pain) was only an accompaniment? This would have repose in the *now* as attention to the immediately operative, and apprehension of time as attention to what is potential. Let us examine the plausibility of this suggestion.

The being-at-work characteristic of human-beings *qua* perception has a perceptual rendering: it manifests as an *occurring* perceptual event, rather than one that is only potentially so. The being-at-work exists in contrast to, and is preceded by, a perceived preparatory phase.[27] One practices, in the view of an anticipated state of being-at-work, by repeatedly going through the relevant motions – imitating the being-at-work – until he has perceptually verified its advantage.[28] Finally, he perceives himself to break the threshold to being-at-work, which may be concentrated, as for a particular competition, or diffused, as for a condition maintained over his whole life. In so being-at-work, he perceives *as* that sort of "worker", so that a person who becomes a musician participates in the perceptual experiences characteristic of musicianship, in a permutation adapted to the particulars of the time and place. Humans may be at-work more or less well, however, as in the case of excellent or merely mediocre musicians. To the extent that one works well, he perceives as an exemplar of that sort of work; having the experiences (living the "drama") not just of a musician but of a remarkably pure model of musicianship. On the one hand, it is the quality of the practice that determines the calibre of the being-at-work; and, on the other, it is in the being-at-work that the calibre of practice is verified. Poor practice manifests in a flawed being-at-work, sometimes with disastrous consequences, as in the case of the tragic *hamartia,* in which case the perceiver turns out to be an exemplar, not of the relevant work, but of the relevant mistake. The plausibility of the link between the *now* and being-at-work, then, lies in the perceptual difference between *practicing* – and so constantly subjecting the potential to

27 *EN* 1105a17-36. At some point the perceiver acquires the readiness to enact at will – having the being-at-work on-hand to duplicate as it were – but prior to this exists the practice phase.

28 This illumination is gradual: as the person verifies one aspect of advantage, subtler ones become evident, and he then adapts his motions accordingly (*EN* 1174a29-39).

repose in the present *now* to the motions leading toward an anticipated better *now* – and *performing* – remaining in a *now* of utmost interest due to its revelation of the "fate" of one's project.[29]

If this is so, the observation of the relative minimum of change would be related to having a front row seat, as it were, at the performance of an activity, rather than witnessing some part of its rehearsal. The standard that the work is subject to, however, is right reason; it is only insofar as one coordinates his practice with *the way things are* that the being-at-work manifests without a fracture resulting, if not in outright breakdown, in corrupted perceptions. The mistaken perceiver may *believe* himself to be at-work – in a way that he is not – indefinitely, but considered in advance we would recognize such hallucination as a central risk of poor practice and not the genuine being-at-work.[30] To the extent that a being-at-work is divorced from theoretical clarity, then, we say its urgency is spurious. The minimum observation of change – sheer flow, or sustained repose in the present – would depend on theoretical alignment.

If this is the case, the pressing interest in the being-at-work – which justifies the subjugating other *nows* to its eventual appearance – would not be for its being the moment of verification of one's practice, but for its ultimate intrinsic interest "for its own sake" in revealing the way things always are.[31] To the extent that a person is at-work well, he perceives the perceptions characteristic of that being-at-work in their purest forms, so that where a mediocre musician – whether admitted hobbyist or with delusions of grandeur – participates in the life of a musician *somewhat*, an excellent musician lives *the* life of a musician. Still, these occupations, even exemplary ones, involve varying degrees of attention to change; even an exemplary general or politician, for example, must always look toward the next campaign. It is not only in living a life according to right reason, but in attending well to right reason itself that one may achieve the ultimate revelation of the eternal and divine available to human-beings.[32] Such humans would then be able to repose in this activity, rather than endlessly subjugate other *nows* toward its discovery. The activity would at times be especially concentrated – but would also, insofar as it is constantly maintained as a *hexis* – affect the perception of one's whole life, so that the exemplary philosopher *lives* the divine life or drama, in its earthly form, to its fullest extent. This experience can be replicated and concentrated in images but only for a short time and only with a

29 The appeal of images such as games or dramatic performances would involve the temporary simulation of such urgency as an escape from one's ongoing duties to the future.

30 Indeed, the tragic figure is so lost in his misapprehension that he is unable to observe the revelation constituting the urgency of the being-at-work he is in fact living through for what it is, only noticing that something was amiss after it has already happened.

31 cf. *EN* 1171b2-5.

32 In the constellation of passages in which Aristotle discusses the activity of *theoria*, it is always bound-up with the life of the divine (*DA* III.4; *EN* X.8; *Meta.* XII.7).

persisting awareness of remaining demands to clock-time.

We see that for Aristotle one may shift between the perception of a undivided or divided *now* by various means. First, insofar as he is experiencing pleasure – a shift which, relatively speaking, is always available to human-beings simply by blocking out the call of self-restraint. Second, insofar as he perceives himself to be at-work in some respect, and so presently witnessing the drama of a figure exemplary in some respect, whether for his excellence or for his mistake. Third, insofar as he truly accords himself with right reason, this finding its peak in the life of the philosopher, which allows perception to disclose the eternal order's manifestation in the particulars to the maximum degree possible. It is only to the extent that one eliminates the causes – such as pain, mere being-in-potency, and ignorance – for external *nows* to impinge on the present one that he can repose in this *now* rather than having to divest it into anticipated others. As Aristotle tells us, *theoria* appears to offer the most sustained repose available to men, representing a pole of minimum divided *now*, maximum flow, or maximum perceptual *timelessness*. Degree of accordance to *theoria*, then, constitutes the vertical dimension of time perception, with the others means of variation relating only incidentally.[33] Now, on the one hand, this conclusion only supports Proclus' assertion that Aristotle has failed to be satisfactorily explicit about the relation of time to Eternity that shows itself in these polarities. On the other, however, even if one limits Aristotle's excellence to the sphere of natural-scientific explanation, the acknowledging of time variability therein allows it to be seen with new clarity from the "ground-up" perspective. This is an advantage of special importance considering that natural-scientific expression is the *lingua franca* of the contemporary age.

33 If this conclusion sounds too alien to Aristotle's thought, it can be phrased more modestly by saying that for Aristotle the observation of time depends on a perceptual act that is performed more or less, that this act is performed less when there exists less demand for its performance, and that there is least demand to the extent that the perceiver is already in their best condition.

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